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Institutions, the Rise of Commerce, and the Persistence of Laws:
Interest Restrictions in Islam & Christianity*
Jared Rubin
California State University, Fullerton
Abstract
Why was economic development retarded in the Middle East relative to Western Europe, despite
the Middle East being far ahead for centuries after the fall of Rome? A theoretical model inspired
and substantiated by the history of interest restrictions suggests that this outcome emanates in
part from the greater degree to which early Islamic political authorities derived legitimacy from
religious authorities relative to those in Europe. This entailed a feedback mechanism in Europe
in which the rise of commerce led to the secular (and eventually religious) relaxation of interest
restrictions while also diminishing the Church’s ability to legitimize political authorities. These
interactions did not occur in the Islamic world despite equally amenable economic conditions.
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1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, a significant amount of research has been conducted in search
of the causes underlying the “rise of the West” (North and Thomas 1973; Jones 1981; Diamond
1997; Landes 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2005; Greif 2006; Clark
2007). In relation to the Middle East, such research takes on a special significance. By almost
any account, the Middle East was far more advanced economically and scientifically than
Western Europe as late as the thirteenth century, yet Middle Eastern economies did not develop
nearly as rapidly as Western European ones did in the ensuing centuries and were far surpassed
economically after the Industrial Revolution (Ibn Khaldun 1379/1958; Mokyr 1990; Kuran 1997;
Lewis 2002).1 Perhaps instead of searching for the factors underlying the rise of the West, the
correct question to pose is the converse one Bernard Lewis (2002) suggests: "What went
wrong?"
Until recently, popular explanations for the economic divergence, especially those
espoused by Max Weber, suggested that the "conservative" or "mystical" nature of Islam
discouraged curiosity (to learn non-Muslim languages or European cartography, take foreign
expeditions, adopt foreign methods and techniques, and so forth) and prevented risk-taking,
innovation, and mechanization (Weber [1922] 1978; Cromer 1908; von Grunebaum 1966; Lewis
1982, 2002). In this view, Islam is seen as inherently hostile to commerce and finance.2 Indeed,
there are numerous historical phenomena which, on the surface, encouraged this line of analysis.
In particular, both religions advocated several laws which inhibited economic development –

1

Throughout this paper, I use the terms "Christian world" and "Western Europe" to denote the pre-Reformation
Christianized regions under the Church of Rome. I use the term "Islamic/Muslim world" somewhat broadly,
comprising North Africa and the "Middle East" (that is, the entire Arab world, Iran, Turkey, the Balkan Peninsula,
and Spain up to the Reconquista). Muslim regions of Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, and the Malay Peninsula
are not the direct focus of this paper, though the arguments are applicable to these regions.
2
For an overview of this literature, see Kuran (1997, p. 49-53).
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such as regulations on taking interest and printing, suppression of women, and laws discouraging
mass education. Although such laws were equilibrium outcomes in the pre-modern settings in
which they emerged, they generally persisted for longer in Islam than in Christianity despite
changing circumstances under which they inhibited economic activity.
Several theories have recently emerged that shed light on these divergent outcomes.
Kuran (1995, 1997) suggests that social pressures in the Islamic world encouraged individuals to
falsify their preferences. In this view, European financial instruments and organizational forms
that were known to Muslims could not be discussed and certainly not adopted. Greif (1994)
contends that cultural differences – Christian "individualism" versus Islamic "collectivism" – led
to the emergence of different institutional forms in which contract enforcement and coordination
based on legal, political, and economic organizations prevailed in Europe instead of the smallgroup sanctions seen in the Islamic world. Ekelund, Hébert, and Tollison (1989) and Ekelund et
al. (1996) suggest that monetary incentives drove the medieval Church’s actions. Though they
are not concerned with the Islamic world per se, their argument can easily be extended to suggest
that differing monetary incentives led to differential relaxation of religious laws in the two
regions.3
Devoid of any historical context, any of these differences may have entailed that
economically inhibitive laws were more likely to persist in the Islamic world than in Western
Christendom. Yet, if any of these hypotheses could be considered the driving force behind the
divergence in economically inhibitive laws, they must be able to account for one of the most
ubiquitous of such laws – restrictions on taking interest (usury) on loans.4 Such restrictions

3

See Rubin (2008) for an extended discussion of other hypotheses that could explain the divergence in economic
outcomes in the Christian and Islamic worlds.
4
Though the terms interest and usury have different meanings in their modern context, in pre-modern times they
were largely synonymous, and will thus be used interchangeably throughout the paper (Divine 1959; Persky 2007).
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prevailed in both religions throughout the medieval period and had an immense impact on the
institutional structure and the types of financial instruments employed in both regions (de Roover
1948; Noonan 1957; Kuran 1986; Munro 2003, 2008; Rubin 2010; Koyama 2010).5 However,
there are numerous phenomena associated with interest regulations for which these and other
proposed hypotheses cannot account. For example, why were Islamic interest restrictions
initially more relaxed than Christian ones, but Islamic restrictions persisted while Christian
restrictions eroded? Why did the Christian Church maintain its interest prohibition for centuries
after commerce re-emerged in Western Europe?
This paper suggests an alternative solution which can account for numerous aspects of
Islamic and Christian interest histories. I argue that the differential persistence of economically
inhibitive laws in general, and interest restrictions in particular, resulted from the greater degree
to which early Islamic political authorities depended on conforming to the dictates of religious
authorities for legitimacy. Religious legitimization has historically been extremely important for
political authorities in both religions, permitting them to extract more from the populace,
discouraging revolt, and enabling access to property rights assignment (Mann 1986; Greif 2002,
2006).6 Although the degree of dependence on religious legitimization is endogenous over time,
I argue that the initial differences between the Islamic and Christian worlds were an exogenous
remnant of the circumstances surrounding each religion’s birth. The unintended, endogenous
consequences of this exogenous difference on equilibrium outcomes are thus amenable to a
theoretical analysis which falls into a broader literature seeking exogenous roots of institutional

5

On the other hand, many scholars have argued that because interest restrictions were easily evaded, they ‘belong
less to economic history than to the history of ideas’ (quoted in Kindleberger 1980, also see Labib 1969; Rodinson
1973; Udovitch 1975; Le Goff 1979; Jones 1988; Pamuk 2004).
6
For more on the role that religious authorities have played in legitimizing the state in the Islamic and Christian
worlds, see Mann (1986), Tierney (1988), Greif (2002, 2006), Coşgel and Miceli (2009), Coşgel, Miceli, and
Ahmed (2009), and Coşgel, Miceli, and Rubin (2010).
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and economic differences (Diamond 1997; Kuran 2001, 2003, 2005; Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson 2001, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff 2002).
Moreover, unlike works directly connecting religious beliefs (Weber [1905] 2002;
Tawney [1926] 1954; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2003) or
religious education (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2009; Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007;
Meyersson 2009; Chaudhary and Rubin 2010) to economic outcomes, this paper seeks an
institutional pathway connecting initial, exogenous religious institutional structures to
differences in economic development. In turn, it provides a connection between Islam and
underdevelopment that does not rely on any feature of religion itself.7
In order to shed light on the unintended consequences of these exogenous institutional
differences, I construct a theoretical model containing three salient features: 1) the existence of a
productive action (such as lending at interest) which is regulated by political and religious
authorities, 2) political authorities are dependent on religious authorities for legitimacy, and 3)
the degree of this dependence is endogenously determined, although the initial level is
exogenous. The model does not attempt to explain why the initial institutional differences
emerged, as they are viewed as exogenously given. Instead, the model analyzes how an
exogenous increase in the returns to production (such as the emergence of capitalistic markets
allowing for investment lending) endogenously affects the interactions between political and
religious authorities under varying degrees of exogenous “initial” dependence. That is, it shows
how both religious laws and the endogenous degree of dependence are in part determined by
exogenous initial conditions (the initial degree of dependence).

7

This paper thus provides an alternative explanation for findings of cross-country regressions connecting religion,
and especially Islam, to economic development (Grier 1997; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso, Sapienza, and
Zingales 2003). For a different view, see Noland (2005).
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I show that when the initial level of dependence is large, institutions which support
economically inhibitive laws are more likely to be self-enforcing. The intuition underlying this
result begins with political authorities in “low-dependence” economies having greater incentive
to relax regulations on productive actions that are highly regulated by religious authorities. In
these economies, the religious authority also has greater incentive to relax its regulation, as it
stands to lose influence or funding from the political authority otherwise. Moreover, since the
religious authority reinterprets its supposedly “eternal doctrine”, the legitimizing relationship is
undermined to a greater extent, resulting in an endogenous change of dependence.
The model also helps explain other, counter-intuitive aspects of interest history. For one,
it provides a rationale for why the Christian Church maintained an interest ban for centuries after
the onset of the Commercial Revolution, only to relax laws in the 14th-15th centuries. It suggests
that the Church relaxed laws only after its legitimizing relationship with political authorities was
endogenously undermined over time by the rise of commerce. Moreover, the model also helps
explain why Islamic interest restrictions were initially more relaxed but eventually stricter than
Christian regulations. It suggests that early commercial pressures encouraged Islamic
reinterpretation of interest doctrine, but because of the high level of dependence, the restrictions
were not fully alleviated and the subsequent levels of dependence were not endogenously
undermined. On the other hand, the relatively low levels of initial dependence in Christianity
meant that once commerce was reborn in Europe, endogenous processes commenced which
eventually undermined both religious interest restrictions and the legitimizing relationship
between political and religious authorities.
Finally, the model has implications that extend well beyond the history of interest
restrictions. Most importantly, it provides a distinction between observed conservatism, which is
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an outcome, and inherent conservatism, which is part of the preference set. It provides testable
predictions which show that conservative outcomes may emerge not from a preference for
conservatism or an inherent resistance to change (as was the preferred explanation of the
Weberian school), but instead from the legitimizing relationship between political and religious
authorities. In turn, the analysis of this relationship sheds a new light on why the ingenuity
associated with early Islamic legal doctrine ultimately stagnated.

2. Interest Restrictions in Islam and Christianity
2.1. Interest Restrictions in Western Christianity
The Church’s ban on taking interest emerged in the fourth century C.E. and officially
became doctrine in 325 when it was included in Canon 17 of the first Ecumenical Council
(Nicæa). The ban was supported by subsequent Church councils, establishing the basis for the
“campaign against usury” in the medieval period.
With European commerce stagnating and most loans being taken for consumption prior
to the tenth century, there was little need for the Church to re-consider its interest prohibition.
When commerce revived, however, investment lending became more important – as Robert S.
Lopez (1971, p. 72) notes, “unstinting credit was the great lubricant of the Commercial
Revolution.” Yet, in this period the Church actually maintained the interest ban, issuing decrees
at the Second, Third, and Fourth Lateran Councils (1139, 1179, and 1215) which proscribed
excommunication for usurers, refused usurers burial in Christian grounds, and interdicted
usurers' offerings (Le Goff 1979; Munro 2003, 2008). In 1234, Pope Gregory IX (1227-1241)
issued his Decretales, which forever classed usurers as infames (making them ineligible to hold
public office, honors, or to testify in court), commanded princes to expel usurers from their
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realms, forbade landlords from renting property to usurers, and invalidated the wills and
testaments of usurers (Munro 2003, 2008). Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the
Church’s “campaign against usury” crystallized into a staunch prohibition in any form, and the
money-lender was linked with the worst type of evil-doers.
Despite these condemnations, a growing number of secular authorities permitted
moderate interest in the thirteenth century, setting laws that merely capped the legal interest
rate.8 Several rulers at least partially promulgated these laws for personal reasons – there are
many accounts of rulers needing access to credit, which was often obtained through forced loans
(Munro 2003). Such loans, which were also known in Venice, Genoa and Florence since the
thirteenth century, were uncontestable and received relatively small interest (Lane 1966, ch. 6;
Mueller 1997, ch. 10-14). Larger loans made by entrepreneurs (which were also often forced) to
secular authorities were risky and default was common, and this was reflected in the interest rate
they received.
From the twelfth century forward, the Church explicitly prohibited manifest usury, or
low-risk credit extended on collateral. This prohibition applied primarily to pawn-brokers and
lombards (who lent for consumption) and was generally not imposed on the merchant-bankers
who dealt in financial instruments with non-guaranteed interest. This left the door open for
religious authorities to permit (through theoretical manipulation) commercial practices which
were in spirit similar to lending at interest but were not riskless and hence not considered
manifest usury. Early alternatives to guaranteed loans at interest included partnerships (societas
or commenda) and the census (or rente), an annuity on a fruitful good which often funded public
finance. These contracts had features implicit in interest-bearing loans and grew deeply
8

In different locales, different types of legal systems were employed to uphold such laws. Mercantile law was
especially important in facilitating contracts which either implicitly or explicitly included a title to interest. See
Berman (1983, ch. 11). For a sample of such laws, see Rubin (2010).
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embedded in commercial relations. They were eventually justified by religious authorities in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as legitimate within the context of Christian thought, centuries
after they were permitted by secular authorities (Noonan 1957, ch. 6-7).9 Likewise, bills of
exchange incited controversy amongst the Scholastics (religious scholars). Bankers used the bills
to make low-risk profit by taking advantage of differences in exchange rates across regions (de
Roover 1963). However, religious authorities were willing to accept their validity in the fifteenth
century, centuries after their secular legality was assured and they became entrenched in
European finance (Noonan 1957).
Closer substitutes to interest-bearing loans emerged in subsequent centuries, including
the triple contract,10 mortgage, and fictitious sales. These contractual forms were eventually
justified by Christian religious authorities, often by resolving them into other, lawful contracts
(Noonan 1957; Divine 1959; Gilchrist 1969).11 A final blow to anti-usury doctrine occurred at
Lateran V (1512-17), when the Church officially sanctioned the monte di pietà, or pious pawn
bank. The ban was officially lifted in a series of decisions between 1822 and 1836 (though it had
long been a dead letter) in which the Holy Office publicly declared moderate interest legal to
everyone. In 1917 the Church offered the Codex iuris canonici, which replaced all earlier
collections of canon law and allowed a legal title to interest (Noonan 1957).
2.2. Interest Restrictions in Islam

9

The first arguments by Church authorities favoring the societas appear in 1270, but the broader relaxation of
restrictions on partnerships arose in the following centuries (Noonan 1957). Innocent IV declared rentes legitimate
in 1251, but this issue was hotly debated and not fully resolved for two more centuries (Munro 2008).
10
The triple contract was made up of three different types of transactions: a contract of partnership (societas),
insurance on the principal of the partnership, and a contract where an uncertain future gain is sold for a lesser certain
gain. Each individual contract was valid, but when combined, simulated a risk-free loan.
11
The scholastics permitted these practices by appealing to theoretical concepts such as lucrum cessans (literally
"profit ceasing", a pre-Smithian term for the opportunity cost of lent money), damnum emergens (loss occurring due
to not having lent money), and interesse (originally a penalty paid for late repayment), all of which quickly gained
currency in theological circles and presaged the Church's official relaxation of the ban (Noonan 1957, ch. 5, 12).
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The prohibition of interest (ribā) has always been a cornerstone of Islamic doctrine. The
Qur'ān contains numerous injunctions forbidding ribā, which in pre-Islamic times was a usurious
process in which the principal sum was doubled and re-doubled (Rahman 1964; Schacht 1995).
In the early Islamic period, commerce thrived to a much greater extent than in Europe,
and lenders frequently employed straight-forward devices (hiyal) designed to facilitate evasions
of the ban (Khan 1929; Schacht 1964, 2006; Coulson 1969; Grice-Hutchinson 1978; Ray 1997).
Most of these devices were not only permitted by religious authorities but were also created by
them. A famous example of a hiyal is the double sale (mukhātara), in which the prospective
debtor sells to a creditor some commodity for cash, then immediately buys it back for a greater
sum payable at a later date. This essentially amounts to a loan at interest, with the interest being
the difference between the two prices. This simple stratagem was known in Medina as early as
the eighth century.
Documentary evidence reveals that transactions involving overt, guaranteed interest were
not a common means of extending commercial credit in early and medieval Islam (Udovitch
1979). In a detailed study of the early twelfth-century Cairo Geniza, Goitein (1967, p. 170)
observes that although credit and commerce flourished in Egypt, "even a cursory examination of
the Geniza material reveals that lending money for interest was not only shunned religiously, but
was also of limited significance economically ... therefore, the economic role of financial
investment today was then fulfilled by various forms of partnerships."12 By the mid-twelfth
century, contracts stipulating interest can be found, but they were either derived from another
type of contract or concealed in another way (Goitein 1967). Illicit transactions could be brought

12

Partnerships, which were the most common form of credit extension and were widespread within the first few
Islamic centuries, most frequently took the form of mudāraba (sleeping partnership) or ‘inān, in which both partners
invested some capital (Goitein 1967; Labib 1969; Udovitch 1970). For an extended analysis of partnerships in the
medieval Islamic world, see Udovitch (1970).
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to court where they were generally voided without further legal consequence (Gerber 1999, p.
129, 141).
Under the Ottomans, more straight-forward interest-bearing lending was permitted. For
example, the Ottoman muftī Ebu’s-su’ud (c. 1490-1574) permitted lending at moderate interest
(though charging greater than 15 percent was considered a criminal offense) under the
euphemistic designations “transaction” or “legal transaction” (Imber 1997, p. 146). Jennings
(1973) shows convincing evidence, in a study of seventeenth-century judicial records in
Anatolian Kayseri, that interest was regularly charged on credit in accordance with the Islamic
law and “secular” law (kanun) and with the consent and approval of the judge’s (kādī) court, the
religious scholars (‘ulamā’), and the sultān. These records indicate that 20% per annum was
considered acceptable and in accordance with the sharī'a. Almost all interest-bearing
transactions Jennings observes involved some sort of ruse, the most popular of which was
istiğlal, which involved the debtor giving his creditor a piece of real estate, supposedly as a sale,
but actually as a pawn (Gerber 1988, ch. 7). It is unlikely that most lenders actually resorted to
such tricks, however. Indeed, many scholarly works indicate that lip-service paid to sharī'a
prevailed throughout the Ottoman Empire.13
Yet, the interest ban has never been fully alleviated in Islam. Direct breaching of the
interest prohibition has always been considered a deadly sin and remains so in modern times,
even if, as a practical matter, interest has been de facto legal for centuries.

13

Imber (1997) argues that the fact that waqf trustees required borrowers to deposit a pledge suggests that they lent
at interest directly. Likewise, Çizakça (1995) shows that the instruments used by the cash waqfs in Bursa were
approved by the courts, but their relatively constant returns suggest that economic interest prevailed. Gerber (1988,
ch. 7) shows that interest ranging between 10 to 15 percent was considered legal in seventeenth-century Bursa, but
such transactions were primarily conducted via ruses (mainly istiğlal). Other common ruses, such as the "wool-sale"
(where a piece of wool is purchased with the price being an interest payment) and resale with a stated profit
(murabaha), attest that transactions conformed with the letter of the law in this period, even though interest-bearing
lending was de facto legitimate.
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3. A Hypothesis: Legitimacy and Institutions
Is it possible to account for differences in interest histories both between Islam and
Christianity and within both religions over time? Though I do not claim that a mono-causal
explanation exists for such complex phenomena, these histories provide numerous facts that any
convincing hypothesis must account for. For example, why did the Church initially react to the
onset of the Commercial Revolution by maintaining interest restrictions, only to relax these
restrictions a few centuries later? Why were interest restrictions relaxed in the Ottoman Empire?
Why were interest restrictions initially stronger in Christianity, but eventually stricter in Islam?
Most importantly, why did interest restrictions dissipate in Christianity but not in Islam?
I suggest that the histories of economically inhibitive religious laws in general and
interest history in particular can be explained by differences in the degree to which political
authorities depended on religious authorities for legitimacy. In both regions, religious
legitimization has historically been extremely important to political authorities, as it created an
environment in which individuals believed in the content of the espoused rules as well as their
efficacy in regulating economic exchange (Greif 2006). Legitimacy permitted secular rulers to
extract more from the populace (though it also allowed religious authorities to extract from the
rulers), discouraged revolt by both citizens and rivals to the throne, and increased the ruler’s
ability to assign property rights (Mann 1986; Greif 2002, 2006).
Although the degree of dependence over time is a function of the political and religious
authorities’ interactions with each other and is thus endogenous (and is modeled as such), I argue
that the initial level of dependence stems from the birth of these religions and is thus exogenous
to the specific doctrines in question. Early Christians were forced to live under Roman authority,
where it was both unnecessary and infeasible to create a legal system based on religious
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principles, and early Church leaders advocated a separation between political and religious
institutions (Mann 1986, ch. 10; Tierney 1988; Feldman 1997). The most famous support for this
position is attributed to Jesus: “Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and unto God
the things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).
On the other hand, Islam was formed at a time of weak centralized power and tribal
feuding in the Middle East. The response of the earliest Muslim caliphs to rival claims of power
was to establish a system of “descendent-based legitimacy”, which supported the Caliph’s claim
to rule via a blood relationship with Muhammad (Greif 2002). Later Muslim rulers (after the
Umayyads) could not reasonably claim a blood-line to the Prophet, but this early history entailed
a situation in which Islamic leaders could legitimize their rule by obeying Islamic dictates, or
what Greif (2002) calls “faith-based legitimacy”. Hence, early Muslim history led to Islamic
ideals becoming those of the state, and there has never been a clear demarcation in the Islamic
world between religious and legal authority like there was for much of Christian history (Lewis
1974, 1993, 1995; Kuran 2005). The exogeneity of these initial differences is argued forcefully
by Tierney (1988, p. 7), who suggests that
…as a society grows from primitive tribalism into an ordered civilization, a
common religion permeates all its activities and helps to form its characteristic
institutions. The rise of medieval Islam provides a typical example. In such
circumstances the creation of political institutions quite separate from the
organization of the accepted religion seems hardly conceivable. Christianity, on
the other hand, irrupted into an ancient civilization that already had its own
established hierarchy of government and its own sophisticated tradition of
political thought based on non-Christian concepts. In the early centuries,
therefore, the Christian church had to develop its own structure of governing
offices, sometimes parallel to but always apart from those of the secular
hierarchy.
This is not to imply that Christian rulers were never dependent on religious rulers for
legitimacy or that Christian doctrine is not conducive to encouraging a legitimizing relationship.
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Indeed, early pre-Christian Jewish leaders ruled at the behest of religious authorities, and the
papacy had a significant degree of power over lay rulers between the eleventh and thirteenth
centuries. I merely suggest that initial differences in the circumstances surrounding the births of
the religions led to differences, however small, that fundamentally affected the future
relationship between political and religious authorities in the two regions.
But can this institutional difference account for all of the peculiarities of interest history?
Although it does not directly contradict any of the facts, it does not obviously account for some
of them. In order to explore this possibility, I build a theoretical model which captures the salient
institutional elements of both religions and analyzes how changes in these elements, particularly
the degree to which political authorities are legitimized by religious authorities, affect
equilibrium actions and the sustainability of economically inhibitive religious laws. The model is
not intended to shed light on why these initial differences in institutional relationships emerged –
as argued above, these differences emerged for historical reasons which are exogenous to the
model. Instead, I analyze the effects of these exogenous differences.

4. Model: Legitimacy, Institutions, and Regulations
4.1. One-Period Model
In this section, I model the relationship between political and religious authorities to shed
light on how their interactions affect secular and religious regulations, such as lending at interest.
The model analyzes the consequences of exogenous events which affect the socially optimal
level of regulation bestowed by the authorities. In the context of lending at interest, such an event
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could be the emergence of capitalistic markets allowing for investment lending.14 Indeed, Rubin
(2009), Brenner (1983), and Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) argue that laws banning interest
were socially optimal in the context of a pre-modern economy with weak social safety nets and
missing contingent markets. Moreover, Rubin (2009) suggests that the initial promulgation of
Christian interest restrictions in the fourth century arose due to the self-interest of the Church,
who acted as a social insurer facing commitment problems (it could not commit to not helping
those who over-borrowed). However, none of these models explain why interest bans persisted
in spite of changing economic circumstances, such as the Commercial Revolution, under which
banning interest (full regulation) was no longer optimal. The present model thus focuses on the
institutional relationships that determine the extent to which religious regulations are relaxed. It
generates other, complementary predictions as well, relating to the timing of such religious
relaxations as well as the conditions under which strict regulations become less severe in the
long run.
Part of the explanation for the persistence of religious regulations (and religious laws in
general) arises from the self-interested resistance of religious authorities to change their doctrine,
as they derive much of their power from their monopoly on “eternal truths” (Rodinson 1973;
Noonan 1993, 2005; Hallaq 2001). “Resistance to change” is modeled as a preference, not an
outcome. One goal of the model is to provide testable predictions related to conservative
outcomes that distinguish between whether they are rooted in a preference for “resistance to
change” or other salient features of the relationship between political and religious authorities,
especially the legitimizing role of religious authorities. To this end, the model employs
historically motivated behavioral assumptions to generate testable predictions which help explain
14

Another example is restrictions placed on the reproduction of words and images, which may have made sense
prior to the invention of the printing press, but were clearly restrictive, especially in the Ottoman Empire, after the
introduction of the press.
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the differential paths of interest regulations across the two religions as well as within the
religions over time.
Consider an economy consisting of two players: a political authority (P) and a religious
authority (R).15 In Europe, the religious authority can be thought of as the Catholic Church, while
in the Middle East, the religious authorities can be thought of as local jurisconsultants (muftīs),
who are the primary source of legal and religious reinterpretation in Islam.16 These players
interact in a one period game of complete information, choosing political and religious
interpretations of laws, which can be thought of as the degree of regulation imposed on the
action in question (such as lending at interest). The political authority chooses a regulation, , to
maximize its utility, which it derives from two sources: conforming to its intrinsic optima, , and
conforming to the dictates of the religious authority, . The parameter

can be thought of as the

legal regulation which maximizes the surplus of the (unmodeled) citizenry. In this case, the tax
base available to the political authority is decreasing in the distance its regulation is from .
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I omit the citizenry as a player for the sake of analytical simplicity, although Rubin (2008) considers such a model
and derives similar results. One potential shortcoming of omitting the citizenry is that the model does not allow for
coordination between the citizens and political authority or amongst the citizens themselves. This type of
coordination could encourage political authorities to relax laws, although it would also require that citizens
coordinate to decrease the importance of religious legitimacy. In any case, it is not clear why this would explain
differences in the Middle East and Western Europe, as the latter was more individualistic while the former was more
communal (Greif 1994), and hence one would expect coordination to be more feasible in the Middle East.
16
It is reasonable to question whether it is appropriate to consider the game played in the Islamic world as one
between political and religious authorities, since the latter were much more decentralized than in Christianity. Sunni
Islam crystallized in its first few centuries into four primary schools of law, all separated geographically. Thus,
much like Church leaders in Christianity, local religious authorities (muftīs and ‘ulamā’) provided dictates –
independent from political authorities (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; Berkey 2003; Hallaq 2005) – within the
constraints of their legal tradition. Even though it certainly could have been possible for a rogue muftī to grant an
opinion not in-line with his legal tradition, it is unlikely that such an opinion would have become part of the
mainstream (which is of concern in the model), as it would have been quite unlikely to be upheld by ijma’
(consensus), one of the four pillars of Islamic legal doctrine. We would expect that due to the decentralized nature of
Sunni Islamic religious authority, there would be different rulings in areas with different commercial and political
pressures (as is suggested by the model). Indeed, Rubin (2010) notes that two schools of Sunni Islam (Maliki and
Shafi’i) explicitly forbade bills of exchange (safatij), fearing that they could be used usuriously, one school
(Hanbali) permitted them as long as no fee was charged, and they were disapproved of, though permitted, by the
Hanafi school. Thus, the broad comparative statics of the model should still hold – both across the two religions and
over time in Islam – since similar institutional relationships and the same corpus of Islamic doctrine are shared in all
Muslim regions.
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Thus, the closer the law is to

, the more relaxed is the regulation.17 The regulation

is

continuous, as are all parameters, reflecting the idea that there are many possible degrees of
regulation. For instance, in the case of interest laws, the political authority may choose to
prohibit interest, permit interest, or allow interest as long as a sufficiently large transaction cost
is undertaken (such as hiyal).
The political authority loses utility when it chooses actions that differ from those chosen
by the religious authority
actions, denoted by

. The extent to which it loses utility from choosing such
, is interpreted as the exogenous degree to which the political

authority derives legitimacy by conforming to the regulation of the religious authority. In other
words, we can write the political authority’s utility as:
.

(1)

The religious authority chooses its regulation, , to maximize its utility, which it derives
from two sources: conforming to its intrinsic optima,
authority’s law, . The parameter

, and conforming to the political

can be thought of as the religious authority’s initial doctrine.

This cost associated with diverging from

arises from the historical observation that both

Christian and Islamic religious authorities have derived much of their power in society from their
monopoly on “eternal truths” (Rodinson 1973; Noonan 1993, 2005; Hallaq 2001). The extent to
which the religious authority loses utility from reinterpreting its eternal doctrine, denoted by
, is interpreted as the degree of the religious authority’s resistance to change. The
religious authority also loses utility when its level of regulation diverges from that imposed by
the political authority,

, as this decreases the religious authority’s influence with the

17

could be modeled endogenously, where the actions of the (unmodeled) citizenry reveal the potential surplus
available to the political authority, and the more relaxed the political interpretation is, the more the citizens reveal. I
have considered such a model in a previous version of this paper (Rubin 2008) and the qualitative results do not
change when is endogenous; instead, the results are exacerbated. I leave as exogenous in the present model
merely for purposes of analytical simplicity.

16

political authority (Ekelund et al. 1996; Greif 2002).18 The religious authority’s utility can be
written as:
.

(2)

I employ the Nash equilibrium concept and denote equilibrium actions with the
superscript *. Assume without loss of generality that

.19 The first order conditions provide

the following best responses:
,

(3)

.

(4)

The Nash equilibrium actions are thus:
,
.

(5)
(6)

The model sheds light on how differences in resistance to change ( ), dependence on
religious authorities for legitimacy ( ), and the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affect
equilibrium regulations. In particular, the model shows how religious and political laws change
) to suboptimal (when

when such laws change from being socially optimal (
increases).
It follows directly from (5) and (6) that

0 and

0. That

is, political and religious relaxation of regulations should follow the occurrence of exogenous
shocks that increase the surplus available to the political authority. The intuition underlying these
18

It is also possible that the religious authority is directly affected by setting regulations that differ from the surplus
maximizing regulation, as this may affect its ability to extract rent from the populace (Duby 1980; Ekelund et al.
1996). However, adding this concern to the utility function does not affect the qualitative results of the model, as the
religious authority indirectly receives disutility, through
, by choosing regulations which differ from the
surplus maximizing one.
19
This entails that
. I employ this inequality when taking first order conditions.
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results is that an increase in the surplus maximizing regulation encourages the political authority
to relax its regulation, which, in equilibrium, encourages the religious authority to relax its
regulation.
Inequalities (7) through (10) indicate that economies with religious authorities more
resistant to change ( ) and those with political authorities who have greater dependence on
religious authorities for legitimacy ( ) have less relaxed regulations. The intuition is straightforward: a greater resistance to change discourages religious authorities from choosing
regulations differing from the initial doctrine, which leads to less relaxed political regulations in
equilibrium. Meanwhile, an increase in dependence encourages political authorities to choose
regulations closer to religious ones, which are in turn closer to initial doctrine in equilibrium.
0,

(7)

0,

(8)

0,

(9)

0,

(10)

Inequalities (7) through (10) suggest that political and religious authorities in economies
with greater religious resistance to change as well as those with greater dependence on religious
authorities for legitimacy impose less relaxed regulations. On the one hand, the model supports
the hypothesis outlined in the previous section that Islamic political and religious authorities
ultimately had more conservative (less relaxed) regulations regarding interest due to the
legitimizing relationship between the two. However, the model is not able to disprove the
alternative hypothesis that this result emerged because of “inherent conservativeness” in Islam
( ) – that Islamic authorities merely had a greater preference for resistant to change than
18

Christian authorities. Indeed, the model suggests that the two are observationally equivalent.
Moreover, there are important historical phenomena for which the model cannot account – for
example, why were interest restrictions more relaxed in much of the Islamic world relative to
western Europe for much of their shared history (until the 14th-15th centuries), only to become
much more relaxed in western Europe? In order to shed light on such questions and differentiate
between alternative hypotheses, I complicate the model slightly in the following section by
endogenizing the dependence parameter ( ).
4.2. Two-Period Model with Endogenous Dependence
The simplicity of the model presented in the previous section obscures some of the
nuances that drive the relationship between political and religious authorities. In particular, it
assumes that the degree to which political authorities depend on religious authorities for
legitimacy, , is exogenous to the interactions between players.20 Yet, it is possible that part of
the reason that religious authorities derive utility from conforming to initial doctrine and from
imposing laws similar to those of political authorities is that doing so also strengthens their
ability to legitimize political authorities. That is, the legitimacy bestowed by the religious
authority may be strengthened or undermined by the interactions between the players, and thus
the dependence parameter, , is endogenous.
In order to clarify how endogenous legitimacy affects actions and outcomes, I consider a
two-period model similar to the one-period model analyzed in the previous section, where
authorities have the same utility functions in each period as they do in equations (1) and (2). The
level of dependence in period one,

, is exogenous, but it is endogenously determined in period

20

There is reason to believe that the resistance to change parameter could also be endogenous, as conservative
actions taken in one period may encourage even further conservative actions in the future, especially if other
arguments are forgotten once they fall out of the mainstream (Kuran 1995). However, adding such a specification
into the model would only exacerbate the same shortcomings of purely conservative arguments spelled out in the
present model.
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two. The level of dependence in period two,

, is a function of 1) the exogenous level of

dependence in the previous period, 2) the degree to which the religious authority reinterprets
“eternal” doctrine in period one,
authorities’ regulations in period one,

, and 3) the distance between the political and religious
. The second factor stems from the historical

observation that both Christian and Islamic religious authorities have generally derived both
power as well as the ability to legitimize secular leaders from their monopoly on “eternal truths”.
When such truths are reinterpreted, the very nature of their authority is threatened (Rodinson
1973; Noonan 1993, 2005; Ekelund et al. 1996; Hallaq 2001). The third factor underscores the
notion that religious authority itself is undermined when religious dictates are widely
transgressed or misaligned with the actions of political authorities. Indeed, this is largely the
reason why accommodating custom has historically been an open concern of Islamic and
Christian religious authorities (Schacht 1964, p. 78-85; Noonan 1966, 1993, 2005; Rodinson
1973; Imber 1997; Libson 1997; Gerber 1999; Hallaq 2001; Zubaida 2003, ch. 1-3).
In this light, the dependence parameter follows the following path:
,
where

and

is constrained so that

(11)

are the relative weights placed on the two sources of legitimacy and
0.

I assume that religious and political authorities do not consider their second period utility
when making their first period decisions. In other words, (11) represents the non-internalized
dynamic costs associated with the religious authority’s actions, whereas its utility function, seen
in equation (2), represents its internalized, static costs. That is, the difference between
that

and

is

, the inherent resistance to change, is internalized by religious authorities, whereas
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represents a non-internalized measure of the erosion of legitimizing ability that occurs over time
as a result of religious authorities “changing” doctrine.
This specification is chosen in part because it allows for a tractable result but, more
importantly, because period two can be interpreted as the “very long run”. In fact, if players have
a sufficiently high discount rate (which would be expected if the actual difference between
periods one and two were many generations), the results presented here are qualitatively similar
to a model where players take into account the discounted effect that their actions have on
legitimacy.21 In reality, it often takes many years for the relationship between political and
religious authorities to fundamentally change, and the political or religious authority in period
one will generally be a different individual than in period two. In the terms of Greif and Laitin
(2004), this means that

is a “quasi-parameter” – one that is exogenous to the players at any

given point in time but endogenous to the game as a whole. This allows for the study of actions
where the institutional setting is endogenously changing (slowly) over time. The institutional
parameters (in this case,

) are viewed by all players as exogenous, yet their actions

unintentionally undermine or reinforce the very institutional structures which constrain their
action set.
This framework employed in the present context explains why the religious authority
may lose its ability to legitimize despite choosing actions that conform to the political authority.
This occurs when

is sufficiently large relative to , meaning that the religious authority draws

its long-run power to legitimize primarily from its hold on eternal truths. Greif (2002) notes, for
example, that the ability of Islamic religious authorities to legitimize political authorities has
often been undermined when it appeared that they favored political authorities over Islamic
21

I have formulated an alternative model where players consider their discounted utility when making choices in
period one and I show that this specification does not alter the comparative statics, though it does provide less
tractable results. This model is available upon request.
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doctrine. The religious authority may choose such actions which eventually limit its ability to
legitimize because it internalizes the static parameters represented in (2) but not the long-run,
institutional parameters in (11).
The political and religious authority’s regulations are the same in the first period as they
were in equations (5) and (6) (replacing

with

). This entails that the equilibrium level of

dependence in period two is:
.

(12)

The Nash equilibrium actions in period two are:
,

(13)

.

(14)

As in the previous section, consider first the effect of a change in the surplus maximizing
regulation ( ). The model sheds light on how religious and political laws change when such laws
change from being socially optimal (

) to suboptimal (when

increases). Unlike

in the one-period model, changes in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affect equilibrium
actions through two avenues. First, such changes encourage the political authority to relax its
interpretation because they directly affect the political authority’s utility. Secondly, an increase
in

negatively affects the legitimacy parameter, as it increases the distance between the religious

authority’s interpretation and optimal action,
between the political and religious regulations,

, and it increases the equilibrium distance
.

This setup provides testable predictions related to three aspects of the interactions
between changes in political and religious laws and changes in the economic environment ( ): i)
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the degree of change of religious laws; ii) the speed and timing of changes in religious laws; iii)
the “reversal effect”, whereby the one economy has more relaxed religious regulations (higher
) in the short run but stricter regulations (lower

) in the long run. These three features are

discussed below.
4.2.1. The Level of Change in Regulations
It follows directly from (13) and (14) that an increase in the surplus maximizing
regulation ( ) results in a relaxation of equilibrium regulation levels. This can be seen in
inequalities (15) and (16):
1

0,

(15)

1

0.

(16)

As in the previous section, the model also reveals how changes in resistance to change
( ) and initial dependence on religious authorities for legitimacy ( ) affect equilibrium levels of
regulation. The comparative statics relating to the political and religious authority’s choices in
the first period are the same as they were in equations (7) through (10) (replacing
However, endogenizing

with

).

provides the following comparative statics in period two:
1

1

,

1

(17)

,

(18)

1

0,

(19)

1

0.

(20)
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Equations (19) and (20) reveal that the degree of relaxation of regulations is decreasing in
the exogenous initial level of dependence ( ), while equations (17) and (18) indicate that the
degree of relaxation of regulations is decreasing in the level of resistance to change ( ) when
is sufficiently large or

is sufficiently small. The intuition underlying these results is straight-

forward: higher levels of initial dependence ( ) encourage political authorities to choose
regulations closer to religious authority’s regulation, which in turn has two effects. First, it
directly entails that the equilibrium choice of regulation is closer to initial doctrine ( ). Secondly,
it provides incentive for the authorities to take first period actions that endogenously undermine
the second period dependence parameter to a lesser extent. On the other hand, high levels of
resistance to change ( ) encourage religious authorities to choose regulations closer to initial
doctrine, which in turn entails that equilibrium political regulations are closer to initial doctrine
( ). Yet, if

is large, the equilibrium choice of strict regulation has the unintended consequence

of undermining the religious authority’s ability to legitimize (as

is large in this case),

and this negative effect on legitimacy can outweigh the direct effect that resistance to change has
on the equilibrium level of regulation.
Moreover, inequalities (21) and (22) show that, on the margin, religious and political
regulations become less relaxed in economies where the initial level of dependence ( ) is high
after there is a positive change in the surplus maximizing regulation.22 The intuition underlying
this result is that political authorities with lower levels of dependence on religious authorities are
more flexible and thus have greater incentive to relax their interpretations. This also has the
indirect effect of endogenously decreasing second-period legitimacy ( ), which further provides
incentive for the political authority to relax its regulation.
22

I do not discuss

and

in this section because their signs are ambiguous and these results do not factor in

the historical analysis.
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1

2 1

1

0, (21)

1

2 1

1

0. (22)

These inequalities do not suggest that religious authorities implement religious
restrictions in an ad hoc manner. What they do suggest is that once a restriction (which may have
been socially optimal at one point in time) is implemented, the flexibility that authorities have to
relax the laws is a function of the broader institutional structure. Indeed, inequalities (21) and
(22) merely indicate that higher levels of initial dependence dampen (but do not eliminate) the
impact of changes in the economic environment ( ) on future policies (

and

). This does not

mean that high-initial dependence or highly resistant to change economies are forever stuck in a
“high-regulation” state, but that the level of the shock necessary to push them away from this
equilibrium is larger.
In sum, the analysis presented in this section suggests that the following relationship
exists between the degree of regulatory change and the parameters of the model:
PREDICTION #1: The degree to which religious and political authorities relax regulatory laws is
decreasing in the initial level of dependence of political authorities on religious
authorities for legitimacy as well as the resistance to change of the religious authority.23
4.2.2. The Timing of Changes in Regulations
Reconsider equations (15) and (16). Comparing these second period results to the first period
statics

and

reveals that

and

. This is true

because an increase in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) affects period two actions through
23

Greater resistance to change does not entail less relaxed laws if is sufficiently large, as is shown in equations
(17) and (18). I do not belabor this point because it works in favor of my hypothesis that the relaxation of religious
laws is tied more to the legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities than it is to the
willingness of religious authorities to change.
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its direct effect on the political authority’s utility as well as through its endogenous effect on
period two legitimacy, whereas it only affects period one actions through the former.
This outcome sheds light on the timing of policy change (

and

) following a change

in . That is, political and religious regulations may not change much in the short run (period
one) following a change in the surplus maximizing regulation ( ) but may change substantially
in the long run (period two). Indeed, when resistance to change ( ) or the initial level of
dependence ( ) are sufficiently large, the regulations of the political and religious authorities
will not change significantly in period one after a change occurs in the surplus maximizing
regulation ( ). However, if the “delegitimizing” parameters,
initial religious doctrine ( ) is sufficiently smaller than

and , are large enough or the

, then an increase in the surplus

maximizing regulation ( ) will lead to significant deregulation (large

and

) in period two.

This occurs because the change in the surplus maximizing regulation endogenously undermines
the dependence of the political authority on the religious authority for legitimacy. In other words,
both authorities may remain adamant in regulating the action for a period of time after an
exogenous shock increases productivity, but they will begin to relax their interpretation after the
salient interactions undermine the legitimizing relationship between authorities. As I show in the
next section, this insight sheds light on lay and religious views on interest in reaction to the
Commercial Revolution in Europe.
This provides a prediction that does not arise from the simpler, one-period model. The
one-period model did not provide a way of differentiating whether resistance to change (a
preference) or dependence (an institutional feature) is the root cause of observed conservatism
(an outcome). In this light, equations (15) and (16) provide a testable prediction which only
arises when legitimacy is the salient force underlying differences in observed outcomes. This is,
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namely, that religious and political regulations may not be relaxed much in the short run (period
one) in response to changes in the surplus maximizing level of regulation, but are relaxed
significantly in the long run (period two). This occurs when the change in the surplus
maximizing regulation endogenously undermines the ability of the religious authority to
legitimize the political authority. It is only after the de-legitimizing occurs that the regulations
are relaxed.
In sum, a second testable prediction arises from the model:
PREDICTION #2: After a shock occurs that affects the surplus maximizing level of regulation,
religious and political regulations may continue to be severe for some time. They will
only begin to be relaxed after the religious authority’s ability to bestow legitimacy is
endogenously undermined.
4.2.3. The “Reversal” Effect
Finally, the model can also account for the “reversal effect”, which occurs between two different
economies when a religious authority in one economy is initially more restrictive (low
the other but becomes less restrictive over time (higher

) than

). To see this, consider two economies,

I (Islamic) and C (Christian), where all parameters are the same except for initial doctrine ( ) and
initial dependence ( ). Denote

and

denote the religious authority’s action

the economy-specific parameters, for
. Assume that

It follows directly from (6) and (10) that if

and

, , and

.

is sufficiently greater than

relative to

, then the religious authority in economy I has a more relaxed regulation in period one
(higher
in the

). This is seen qualitatively in Figure 1, which graphs the religious authorities actions
plane (where the axes should be interpreted as

are placed at the origin). It is straight-forward to show that, given

and

, since

and

, there is a threshold level
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of

where any

above the threshold entails that the religious authority in economy I has a

more relaxed period one regulation.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
However, it is possible that a greater initial level of dependence ( ), combined with a
more relaxed initial doctrine ( ), may be the very reason why the religious authority in economy
I has a more restrictive regulation in period 2. This result arises because the second period
dependence parameter endogenously diminishes by less in economy I. This follows directly from
(12), and intuitively holds because the religious authority in economy I chooses actions in period
one which are closer to both the initial doctrine and the political authority’s action – thus
endogenously undermining legitimacy to a lesser extent. That is, the factors that undermine
legitimacy are less present in economies with greater levels of initial dependence and more
relaxed initial doctrine, all else being equal.
This logic entails that a “reversal” happens in part of the parameter space.24 It is possible
that the religious authority in economy I has a more relaxed regulation in period one (

)

but a less relaxed regulation in period 2. The range over which a reversal arises can be seen in
Figure 1. In this range, the sufficiently large levels of both

and

entail that the dependence

parameter in economy I does not endogenously decrease by much relative to the dependence
parameter in economy C. In economy C, the relatively low levels of

and

mean that the

religious authority chooses actions in period one which either diverge from initial doctrine or
from the political authorities’ action (or both), thus endogenously undermining dependence.
Hence, a “reversal” can occur when the parameters which encourage a stricter regulation in
period one (namely,

and

) also work to undermine dependence.

24

That a “reversal” happens in part of the parameter space, as shown in Figure 1, is straight-forward to prove. The
proof has been omitted but is available upon request.
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The following prediction thus arises:
PREDICTION #3: A “reversal” can happen between two economies, where the religious authority
in the economy with a more relaxed initial doctrine ( ) and greater initial dependence
( ) has a more relaxed regulation in period 1 but a less relaxed regulation in period 2.
This can only occur if the dependence parameter is endogenously undermined less in this
economy than it is in the other economy between the two periods.

5. Interest History, Institutions, and Legitimacy in the Context of the Model
In this section I employ the insights of the model to shed light on numerous aspects of
interest history and changes in relations between political and religious authorities. I begin by
discussing how the institutional histories relate to the level of change in interest history
(Prediction 1) and proceed to analyze the timing of changes (Prediction 2) and the reversal effect
(Prediction 3).
5.1. Institutions and the Level of Change in Interest Laws in Islam and Christianity
A convincing hypothesis must account for two stylized facts noted in section 2 regarding
the level of change of interest doctrine. These are: i) interest was strictly banned until the
fourteenth-fifteenth centuries in Christianity, when the Church began to relax interest laws; ii)
even though interest laws were stricter in early Christianity than in early Islam, interest
restrictions were never fully alleviated in Islam.
In the context of the model, the growth of commerce in the late-tenth through thirteenth
centuries can be viewed as the event which sparked interactions between western European
political and religious authorities. Prior to this period, loans were primarily taken for
consumption, and hence usury laws were not necessarily inhibitive (Glaeser and Scheinkman
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1998; Rubin 2009). Yet, the emergence of capitalistic markets meant that investment lending
was feasible and that interest restrictions thereby inhibited economic activity.
Access to credit continued to grow and commercial opportunities became more abundant
at the height of the Commercial Revolution in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Lopez 1971).
In terms of the model, this meant that regulations on taking interest were more detrimental to
economic efficiency (

increased), and secular authorities had greater incentive to legalize

moderate interest, which they did throughout the continent.25 The model predicts that political
authorities should have responded by relaxing their regulations in spite of religious
condemnation. And indeed, the twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw a flurry of secularly
approved, but religiously prohibited, innovations of commercial instruments – bills of exchange
emerged as a commercial instrument of importance at the Champagne fairs, rentes were
employed for public finance, and the Church-prohibited sea-loan was widely used (Berman
1983; Munro 2003, 2008). This is precisely what is predicted by inequality (21) – lower levels of
initial dependence ( ) exacerbate the impact of changes in the economic environment ( ) on
future policies ( ).
These events eventually undermined (endogenously) the Church’s authority vis-à-vis
political authorities, as suggested by the model. Tierney (1988) and Feldman (1997) argue that
ecclesiastical leaders lost much of their authority over secular rulers in the mid-to-late thirteenth
century ( decreased) as a result of the growth of secular power into national kingdoms, new
theories of the state based on Aristotelian foundations, and movements of criticisms within the
Church. The loss of ecclesiastical power in this period is perhaps best exemplified by the
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An alternative hypothesis is that secular leaders legalized interest as soon centralized states emerged rather than
after dependence on religious authorities diminished. While states and secular law were indeed emerging in this
period (Berman 1983), such a hypothesis would have difficulty explaining why previous secular leaders such as
Charlemagne denounced interest.
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Avignon Papacy (1309-1377), where the papal chair was largely under control of the French
monarch. It was only after this loss of legitimizing power ( ) that the Church began to relax
interest laws, as noted in section 2.
In the Islamic world, on the other hand, widespread commercial opportunities arose well
before they did in Europe (Goitein 1967; Labib 1969; Udovitch 1975). It is thus misleading to
compare the two regions at any one given point in time – instead, we should focus on the
consequences of the semi-institutionalized enactment of interest restrictions in the Middle East
and North Africa upon the adoption of Islam.
As noted in Section 2, devices for circumventing the interest ban (hiyal) were known
from the first Islamic centuries. Despite their questionable legality, most hiyal were permitted by
religious authorities, and many were even created by them. Yet, transactions involving
guaranteed interest were not a common means of extending commercial credit in early and
medieval Islam (Udovitch 1979). In terms of the model, early Islamic religious authorities did
reinterpret doctrine, but their regulations remained restrictive. Why were interpretations initially
flexible but ultimately stagnant?
Again, the model focuses our attention on the interactions between political and religious
authorities. Within the first Islamic century, muftīs (the primary source of legal and religious
reinterpretation in Islam) and other religious scholars gained considerable power as an
independent legitimizing force (Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996; Berkey 2003; Hallaq 2005).
In turn, early Islamic leaders, who attained and maintained their right to rule by obeying Islamic
dictates (Greif 2002), faced significant costs from not complying with Islamic law ( was very
large). This meant that Muslim political authorities and lenders had little incentive to “push the
envelope” of what was permissible, and hence overwhelmingly permitted and conducted
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transactions that could be construed as within the confines of religious law. In turn, such
transactions were relatively inexpensive for Muslim religious authorities to permit, as they did
not entail a significant reinterpretation of doctrine. This led to the emergence of an equilibrium in
which lending at interest was permitted, but only if a sufficient transaction cost (hiyal or other
cumbersome transaction) was undertaken. In terms of the model, religious regulations were more
relaxed than the initial ban on interest ( ), but not by much.
This equilibrium entailed that little endogenous institutional change (related to the
legitimizing relationship between religious and political authorities) occurred in the Islamic
world after the first few Muslim centuries. Religious regulations on interest were partially
relaxed and the exogenous level of initial dependence ( ) was large, so no player had incentive
to change actions much – and thus endogenously undermine dependence – without the presence
of a large shock. This does not mean that political authorities faced no challenges, only that
“faith-based” legitimacy remained extremely important in most Islamic polities and was unlikely
to be undermined by endogenous factors.
These histories can now be compared in the context of the model. The high, exogenous
initial level of (relative) dependence in the Islamic world provided little incentive for changes to
occur in either interest laws or subsequent (endogenous) levels of dependence. On the other
hand, the lower, exogenous initial levels of dependence in Christianity encouraged changes on
both fronts, in turn entailing that interest restrictions persisted for much longer in Islam than in
Western Christendom (Prediction 1).
Commercial pressures to relax interest restrictions existed earlier in the Middle East than
in Western Europe. Hence, the relaxation of interest restrictions happened earlier in the Middle
East. Yet, due to a higher degree of exogenous initial dependence in the Middle East, interest
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restrictions were not fully alleviated, and the endogenous processes that eventually undermined
both Christian interest restrictions and the Church’s ability to legitimize political authorities in
Europe did not occur in the Islamic world. The model suggests that the endogenous erosion of
dependence was more likely to happen in Europe, where the initial level of dependence was
lower.
Once the dependence of political authorities on religious authorities for legitimacy
eroded, Christian interest restrictions became relaxed. On the other hand, such an institutional
change did not occur (at least to that extent) in much of the Islamic world, where interest
restrictions are still a salient economic feature today. For instance, a significant factor underlying
the recent rise of Islamic banking is that loans are formed in ways which do not officially
constitute interest (ribā).26
These histories provide evidence for the primary prediction of the model: higher degrees
of exogenous initial dependence of political authorities on religious authorities for legitimacy
encourage more severe religious regulations of productive actions in the long run. In more
general terms, exogenous initial differences in institutional arrangements, however small, can
encourage the relevant players to interact in such a manner that vastly different equilibria emerge
over time.
5.2. The Timing of Changes in Interest Laws
As noted in Section 2, Christian interest restrictions were maintained in the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. On the surface, the rationale for this attitude is not obvious – why would the Church
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Moreover, institutional arrangements similar to those in the Ottoman period still exist today; state muftīs were
appointed in the twentieth century in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Yemen, and Indonesia, and twentieth
century constitutions in Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Morocco and Iran (to name a few) include provisions making the
sharī’a the law of the land (Schacht 1964, p. 107-110; Masud, Messick, and Powers 1996).
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maintain the prohibition just as access to credit was beginning to lubricate commerce? Does the
model say anything about the timing of changes in Christian interest restrictions?
The model provides an explanation that relates the Church’s maintained anti-usury stance
to its increased legitimizing role.27 In general terms, Prediction 2 suggests that religious
authorities may initially remain conservative after a positive economic shock such as the
Commercial Revolution, but they will reinterpret doctrine after the interactions of the relevant
players endogenously undermine the legitimizing relationship between political and religious
authorities. That is, religious authorities will continue to strictly regulate the action for some
time, as they incur a cost from reinterpreting “eternal” doctrine. In fact, the papacy and the
Scholastics (religious scholars) cited such “eternal” doctrine, synthesized with Aristotelian
thought, in their efforts to maintain the ban (Noonan 1957; Munro 2003).
The growth of commerce was at least partially responsible for the endogenous
undermining of the legitimizing relationship between political and religious authorities, in the
manner described in the model. Mann (1986) and Greif (2005, 2006, ch. 4, 8, 12) argue that
national kingdoms emerged due to the growing importance of commerce and medieval cities, not
the Church.28 Merchants needed pacification between states and in foreign states and hence
turned to secular leaders to provide such protection in return for loans or taxes. Pacification, in
turn, fostered urban growth and the further development of trade, which necessitated more
complex (and usurious) financial instruments. Mann (1986, p. 437) suggests:
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If anything, papal power increased in this period, but for reasons exogenous to the model. The papacy maintained
significant power vis-à-vis secular authorities following the Papal Revolution led by Gregory VII in the late eleventh
century and the resolution of the Investiture Controversy at the Concordat of Worms (1122). Both of these events
gave the Church immense power until the end of the thirteenth century (that is, was relatively large) (Berman
1983; Mann 1986; Tierney 1988; Feldman 1997).
28
Lopez (1971), Jones (1997), and Greif (2006) similarly argue that the Italian city-states were built by merchants
for merchants. Though religion was extremely important in the communes, the interests of religious authorities were
generally subordinate to those of the merchant elite.
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By the twelfth century, economic growth was generating technical problems
involving more complex economic relations between strangers to which the
church was more marginal. The closer relationship between markets, trade, and
property regulation, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, gave the state
new resources that it could use to enhance its own power, especially against the
papacy.
One link made in this paper is that the growth of national kingdoms and commerce was in
part made possible by widespread secular alleviation of anti-interest dictates. On the one hand,
employment and secular acceptance of prohibited financial instruments and transactions was
essential for the commercial growth that preceded the rise of kingdoms and cities.29 On the other
hand, these events also endogenously undermined the Church’s power over secular authorities.
These two forces reinforced each other until a new equilibrium emerged – as more profitable
commercial opportunities became available, merchants further evaded the Church’s dictates and
sought protection from secular authorities. This provided greater incentive for rulers to provide
security and legalize interest, as it decreased the importance of religious legitimacy ( ) and
increased the profitability of credit extension ( ). Hence, the Church’s loss of power vis-à-vis
secular rulers was itself both a cause and a consequence of the rise of commerce and the
resulting interactions between merchants, the Church, and political authorities.
Although the Church initially responded to the Commercial Revolution by maintaining
its anti-usury stance, this had the unintended consequence of eventually diminishing its ability to
legitimize political authorities. Prediction 2 suggests that, in turn, the Church should begin to
relax interest restrictions only after its legitimacy was endogenously undermined. In fact, it was
only after the importance of the legitimizing relationship eroded in the mid-thirteenth century
29

Conversely, Berman (1983, p. 338) argues that the Church encouraged commerce in this period, noting that the
Church “encouraged the pursuit of money or riches provided that such pursuit was carried on for certain ends and
according to certain principles.” This line of thought is not completely contradictory to the argument made in this
paper, however. I never claim that the Church opposed profit or was even ultimately inflexible in its views on
interest. Instead, I suggest that this flexibility was only realized after merchants transgressed some of the Church’s
stricter dictates.
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that political authorities relaxed their restrictions, and the Church followed suit over the
subsequent centuries. The “campaign against usury” halted in the late-fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries and the Church slowly began to permit alternatives to interest thereafter. By the end of
the fifteenth century, religious authorities permitted even more openly usurious practices such as
bills of exchange and the triple contract. The timing of changes of Christian interest restrictions
thus accords with the model’s intuition – as secular dependence on the Church endogenously
diminished in medieval Europe, political and religious authorities relaxed interest restrictions,
and the institutions supporting the ban were undermined.
This history also provides evidence in favor of the primacy of legitimizing relationships
( ) over inherent resistance to change ( ) in the determination of religious and political laws.
Prediction 2 indicates that when the legitimizing relationship is important, a lag between
economic shocks (such as the Commercial Revolution) and changes in religious interpretations
may occur, as the shock leads to interactions which over time undermine the ability of religious
authorities to legitimize. On the other hand, there is no clear avenue through which an inherent
resistance to change has the same effect on equilibrium outcomes. Hence, the model provides a
prediction – supported by the history – whereby institutional features and not conservative
preferences are shown to be the driving force behind conservative outcomes.
As explained above, endogenous institutional change like that experienced in Western
Europe was less likely to occur in the Islamic world, since the initial level of dependence was
much greater in the latter. Yet, a “natural experiment” which further tests the model occurred
when exogenous economic and socio-political changes took place in the early Ottoman period.
The two primary changes were increased demographic heterogeneity (which limited the
coordinative ability of the masses) and decreased external threats (Coşgel, Miceli, and Ahmed
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2009). Both of these changes decreased the ruler’s need for legitimacy from religious authorities
( decreased, though it was still large), since the threat posed by both internal and external rivals
was greatly diminished. In turn, the Ottoman sultans brought the religious authority (the muftī
hierarchy) into the state, a change which enabled a “limited but significant expansion in the
ruler’s prerogatives in relation to the sharī’a” (Berkey 2003, p. 264).
These changes provide a further test for the theory, which predicts that a relaxation of
interest restrictions should follow these events. Indeed, Section 2 notes that interest restrictions
were significantly relaxed in this period, although lip service paid to the sharī’a was still
necessary to ensure the legality of the contract. Contracts indicating that interest was considered
acceptable and in accordance with the sharī'a were common, and it is possible that the actions
which provided coherence with the sharī'a were never actually carried out. The necessity of
including some sort of ruse, however, indicates that neither interest regulations nor the
legitimizing relationship were fully undermined, and indeed, religious authorities remained
extremely influential vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultans. This history indicates, therefore, that
exogenous institutional changes that undermined the legitimizing relations between political and
religious authorities ( ) – but not the inherent resistance to change ( ) – were the driving force
behind religious relaxations of interest. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that a change in
the religious authorities’ inherent resistance to change occurred prior to the relaxations of interest
restrictions.
5.3. The Reversal Effect
Finally, the model also sheds light on the fact that Islamic interest restrictions were more
relaxed than Christian ones until at least the fourteenth century. As noted above, early Islamic
religious authorities not only permitted evasions of the interest ban (hiyal), but often created the
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evasions. It can be readily explained why these phenomena occurred centuries before Christian
relaxation of interest restrictions: there were greater commercial pressures ( ) for change in the
first few Islamic centuries. Yet, the interest ban was not alleviated in early Islamic history, and
this created a situation where any future relaxations of Islamic doctrine would have come relative
to a more “relaxed” doctrine (higher ) than in Christianity.
Ironically, the model suggests that these early relaxations, combined with a higher degree
of initial dependence, may have been the cause of subsequent stagnation of interest restrictions.
Because Islamic religious restrictions were relatively relaxed – and there was a higher level of
exogenous, initial dependence in these economies – there was less endogenous erosion of the
legitimizing relationship over time, as religious authorities chose actions closer to both the
political authorities as well as long-established religious precedent.
On the other hand, the Christian interest ban remained quite strong through the thirteenth
century. When the Commercial Revolution commenced in the tenth and eleventh centuries,
religious authorities maintained the full ban on interest ( was lower (less relaxed) in Christianity
than in Islam). However, over the course of the next few centuries, the more restrictive
regulations, along with a lower level of dependence, also encouraged actions between political
and religious authorities which ultimately undermined dependence.
As noted in Prediction 3, such a “reversal”, where Christian interest doctrine was initially
less relaxed but ultimately more relaxed than Islamic interest doctrine, could only occur if the
dependence relationship is endogenously undermined before the reversal occurs – which is
shown to be the case. In other words, although the initial interest regulations in Islam were more
relaxed than in Christianity, the endogenous weakening of the legitimizing relationship between
political and religious authorities led to a “reversal”.
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In all, this analysis by no means is meant to indicate that the interactions between
political and religious authorities in relation to economically inhibitive laws were the sole
driving force of change in Church-State relations in Europe (and the relative lack of such change
in much of the Middle East).30 Yet, this history reveals how small exogenous differences in
institutional arrangements and initial conditions can have immense consequences. It suggests that
the European Commercial Revolution was in part made possible by the exogenous type of
relationships between political and religious authorities stemming from the conditions
surrounding the birth of Christianity – and it was precisely due to these initial conditions that
religious authorities eventually had to adapt to keep up with economic and political change. This
is not to say that a Commercial Revolution could not have happened in the Islamic world. As the
model suggests, these differing institutional structures merely meant that a larger “shock” was
necessary in the Islamic world to precipitate interactions that could undermine the legitimizing
power of religious authorities as well as interest restrictions.
These differences were exacerbated by the fact that institutions do not emerge in
isolation, but are contingent on historical events, path dependence, and institutional complexes
(Kuran 2005; Greif 2006). The interactions between the relevant players pushed the institutional
paths of the Islamic world and Western Christendom in vastly different, self-enforcing
directions. On the one hand, the interaction between the rise of secular authority and European
trade networks supported further economic developments such as complex financial instruments,
impersonal exchange, and the corporate form (Greif 1993, 2000, 2006; Kuran 2005; Rubin

30

Indeed, another important difference between the two religions which is not considered in the model is that the
pre-Reformation Church was extremely hierarchical while Islamic religious authorities were much more
decentralized. Yet, this should work in favor of Islam being the less conservative religion, as jurisdictional
competition would encourage innovation and accommodation of custom. For the same reason, it is more likely that
Islamic political authorities would be able to bribe religious authorities to relax restrictions, as decentralized Islamic
authorities had less power to lose by reinterpreting doctrine and much more to gain relative to their wealth.
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2010). On the other hand, the constraints faced in the Islamic world discouraged such a path – or
at least, a greater shock was necessary to undermine the political and religious relationship than
in Christendom. Instead, less economically beneficial institutions and smaller, personal exchange
networks persisted for centuries in the Islamic world (Goitein 1967; Udovitch 1975; Kuran 2001;
Greif 2002; Rubin 2010).

6. The Big Picture: Was the “Gate of Ijtihād” Really Closed?
This paper tackles an important route through which religion directly impacts economic
outcomes: the perpetuation of laws inhibiting economically productive actions. By refraining
from attributing anything inherent in religion as the force underlying the economic divergence,
this framework encourages a reconsideration of traditional notions of conservatism (based on a
preference for conservatism) in the Islamic world. The most influential of these ideas is that the
"gate of independent reasoning (ijtihād)” was closed in the tenth century (C.E.). Until recently,
historians generally agreed that in this period some informal consensus arose that independent
reasoning, an important method of reinterpretation in the first three Islamic centuries, was no
longer an acceptable means of finding truth and that henceforth jurists were only allowed to
follow precedents (Schacht 1964, ch. 10; Coulson 1969; Weiss 1978). Under this theory, juristic
ingenuity was stifled in Sunni Islam after the founding of the four schools consolidated what had
been widely dispersed judicial authority. Instead of exercising ijtihād, jurists were confined to
accepting religious authority (Hallaq 2001, ch. 4).
Some recent scholarship disputes this notion. Gerber (1999, ch. 4-7) cites myriad cases
throughout the medieval period where ijtihād was employed. In a study of rulings by the
seventeenth-century Palestinian muftī Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī, Gerber notes that numerous
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disagreements which remained unresolved in the classical and post-classical periods arose in alRamlī's time, necessitating a relaxation of devotion to the ancient masters. Likewise, Hallaq
(1984, 2001) notes in great historical detail that the gate of ijtihād did not close in theory or in
practice, though its practice became increasingly rare in the medieval period.
If the gate of ijtihād was not closed, independent reasoning was less frequently practiced
after the tenth and eleventh centuries. Indeed, Gerber (1999, p. 138) acknowledges that ijtihād
was not freely permitted in every field, but only in those in which the law remained open. In this
light, I propose an alternative metaphor: the "gate of ijtihād" may have been closed, but the gate
was not locked. All that was necessary for the gate to be opened was for political authorities,
merchants, and other interested parties to attempt to push it open. But, due to the incentives
supported by the prevailing institutions, few had incentive to “push the gate open”, and observed
behavior led to the appearance that the gate was closed and locked. The analysis in this paper
suggests that there was not necessarily a preference-based inherent “resistance to change” that
facilitated conservative outcomes, but instead these results emanated from the incentives put in
place by the institutional structure. Indeed, if the gate were not really locked, we might expect to
see ijtihād in aspects of law which fostered better economic outcomes, such as those studied by
Gerber and Hallaq. However, the overwhelming cost of pushing the gate open when such
pressures did not exist was the reason that the gate seemed locked. And once such equilibria
emerged in the tenth century, beliefs in the gate's closure were supported, further reinforcing the
relationship between Islamic religious and political authorities. This insight allows us to view
Islamic legal and economic history through a different lens by looking beyond the scope of
observed actions to understand the institutions, behaviors, and incentives underlying them.
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7. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the role that religious, political, and legal institutions played in
sustaining and undermining economically inhibitive religious laws in medieval Islam and
Christianity. I suggest that a salient difference between the two religions’ institutional structures
is the greater degree to which political authorities were dependent on the dictates of the religious
authorities for legitimacy in early Islam. To shed light on the consequences of this difference, I
identify the salient players involved in the reinterpretation of religious doctrine (religious and
political authorities) and construct a model to identify their interactions under varying
institutional conditions. I show that when the initial level of dependence is small, political
authorities have incentive to relax regulations on productivity-enhancing actions (such as lending
at interest), providing greater incentive for religious authorities to reinterpret “eternal” doctrine –
even though such reinterpretation endogenously diminishes its ability to bestow legitimacy. The
opposite is true when the initial level of dependence is large, and the institutions supporting
regulations on productivity-enhancing actions are self-enforcing.
The logic underlying these interactions and outcomes helps account for the salient
features of Islamic and Christian interest histories. Moreover, it potentially sheds new light on a
variety of historical phenomena in which the interactions between religious institutions and other
institutions (political, economic, legal, and social) affected economic outcomes, such as the
differing paths of Islamic and Christian laws concerning printing, slavery, insurance, the
economic role of women, and education. While significant in their own right, especially given
the role that unintended consequences can play in institutional and economic development,
studying such cases within the framework presented in this paper provides insight into a much
broader economic reality. Contrary to the predilections of many previous scholars, this
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framework turns purely cultural explanations (based on the “conservative nature” of Islam) of
the divergence between Western European and Middle Eastern economies on their head. That is,
while we certainly see conservative, slowly-changing outcomes in the Islamic world, these
phenomena can be understood as a result of the institutional structures and not as a cause of
economic stagnation.
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FIGURES
Figure 1: Reversal in Religious Interpretation

rI > rC in both periods

REVERSAL
> rC in period 1
C
r > rI in period 2

rI

rC > rI in both periods

49

